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Abstract 
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) encourages scientists to participate in bottom-up risk 
communication approaches that directly engage hazard-prone populations. Effective communication of seismic risks not 
only has economic impacts in terms of hazard mitigation but also provides social value in potentially empowering the 
marginalized populations that disproportionately live in high-risk areas. This emphasis on community-focused disaster 
preparedness, however, presents a novel set of communication challenges for geoscientists. Few scientists have training 
in or experience of translating their science for lay publics, and conveying complex risk information is especially difficult 
in circumstances where scientific issues are socially contested and politically charged. Recognising that disaster threats 
can create troublesome information battlegrounds, this paper explores the ethical and practical aspects of seismic risk 
communication, motivated by an early-career earth scientists’ workshop in Istanbul that voiced the concerns of young 
geoscientists confronted firsthand by at-risk publics. Those concerns form the basis of a wider review of the risk commu-
nication issues that are likely to be encountered if community-centred participatory DRR approaches are to be adopted 
by earthquake science researchers. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
here has to be a broader and a more peo-
ple-centred preventive approach to disas-
ter risk. Disaster risk reduction practices 
need to be multi-hazard and multi-sectoral, inclu-
sive and accessible in order to be efficient and effec-
tive. (...) There is a need for the public and private sec-
tors and civil society organizations, as well as academ-
ia and scientific and research institutions, to work 
more closely together and to create opportunities for 
collaboration.’ (Sendai Framework, 2015, p.7). 
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Re-
duction (SFDRR) offers a new global instru-
ment for confronting natural hazards, setting 
out an ambitious holistic strategy that embrac-
es the need for a ‘… full and meaningful partici-
pation of relevant stakeholders at appropriate levels’ 
and  the ‘… empowerment and inclusive, accessible 
and non-discriminatory participation of the most 
marginalised publics’ (UNISDR, 2015). As such, 
the Sendai Framework defines a new social 
contract between the hazard  scientist and the 
wider public (Ismail-Zadeh et al., 2017). It is a 
‘T 
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contract that encourages the scientific comm u-
nity to endeavour, alongside their existing 
technical expertise, to ‘… support action by local 
communities and authorities; and support the inter-
face between policy and science for decision-making’ 
(UNISDR, 2015). This vision  of citizen-oriented  
research is mimicked in other areas of geo-
societal concerns, such as energy, climate 
change and infrastructure development (e.g. 
Pidgeon et al., 2014; Kamlage and  Nanz, 2017), 
and is one increasingly endorsed  by major in-
ternational sponsors of scientific research. The 
European Commission, for example, changed  
the title of their ‘Science and Society’ pro-
gramme to ‘Science in Society’ and under Hori-
zon 2020 developed guidelines around ‘Re-
sponsible Research and  Innovation’ (RRI) with 
the deliberate goal of stimulating reflexivity 
and involving a range of social actors - scien-
tists, citizens, politicians and  businesses - more 
closely in scientific endeavours that were co-
designed  and co-produced by society (Owen et 
al., 2012). 
Inherent in this shift from the conventional 
‘top-down’, ‘expert-led’ approach to the emer-
gent ‘bottom -up’, ‘community-led’ approach is 
the challenge of ‘the last mile’ - a term bor-
rowed from the telecommunications sector, in 
which the final connection between the con-
sumer and the technology determines how ef-
fective it is for the vast market of users. The 
challenge of reaching the last mile (in this case, 
reaching those people d irectly at risk) has be-
come a critical notion that increasingly informs 
our thinking about a far wider range of natural 
risk challenges (e.g. Shah, 2006), although in 
keeping with the shift to a people-centred  focus 
of d isaster risk reduction d iscourse it has be-
come re-framed as ‘the first mile’ (e.g. Kelman 
and Glanz, 2014; Baudoin et al., 2016). 
In addition to informing civic officials and  d is-
seminating to policy makers, communicating 
that first mile to reach the people who directly 
face extreme hazard  threats ought to be a fairly 
uncontentious component in hazard  prepared-
ness and mitigation efforts. Yet, a participatory 
approach marks a methodological move away 
from the prevailing mode of knowledge tran s-
fer towards more inclusive transdisciplinary 
strategies that incorporate peer-role models, 
adopt social network-based  strategies and d i-
rectly engage with communities in motivating 
preparedness actions (Schneidewind et al., 
2016; Schlosser and  Pfirman, 2012; Drake et al., 
2015; Bendito and  Barrios, 2016; Ismail-Zadeh 
et al., 2017). This new, transdisciplinary science 
has been controversial (Schneidewind and  
Brodowski, 2014) and there are currently no 
guidelines for what constitu tes successfu l par-
ticipation and what measures promote build-
ing trust between civil society and  its organiza-
tions and science. Despite the international 
push for participatory approaches, there is a 
lack of social spaces and  interactive formats 
that enable exchange and joint learning be-
tween technical specialists and lay publics. A 
review of people-centred  approaches for d isas-
ter risk management described: 
 
‘… a complex landscape characterized by insuffi-
cient resources at the local level, and lack of will-
ingness among the public at risk to share responsi-
bility for disaster risk management with author-
ities. If official authorities are to implement the new 
people-centred approach, they must better under-
stand residents’ perspectives and responsibility ex-
pectations, become more competent communicators, 
and be willing to engage in long-term dialogue with 
communities’ (Scolobig et al., 2015, p.202). 
 
The challenge of how to communicate effec-
tively to at-risk communities, therefore, lies at 
the heart of the people-centred  approach to 
d isaster risk reduction. Despite this, few geo-
scientists have been trained in conveying their 
technical know -how beyond  the academic and  
professional world , and, for those that have, 
that training usually prioritises peer -to-peer 
communication skills and how to manage rela-
tions with journalists and  better access the 
broader print and  broadcast media (Liverman 
2008). In contrast, ord inary people ‘on the 
ground’ - from local community groups to civic 
authorities - tend to be less familiar and more 
remote (i.e. harder-to-reach) audiences for most 
scientists (Liverman 2008, Stewart and  Nield  
2013). 
In addition to being ‘harder to reach’, public 
audiences often meet ‘science’ at times of crisis. 
In emergency situations, scientific understan d-
ings built up  gradually over many decades are 
expected  to be delivered  by ‘experts’ in neat 
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media sound-bites and unambiguous public 
statements (Stewart and  Nield , 2013). Distilling 
complex technical knowledge into d igestible 
popular risk messages that can be readily con-
sumed by lay audiences is a persistent chal-
lenge for those working at the science/ public 
interface. In the immediacy of an emerging d is-
aster, people tend to behave in ways and make 
decisions that are not anticipated  by scientific 
experts and by emergency managers.  
Outside of crisis situations, communicating u n-
certainty to at-risk publics is associated  with 
several challenges, such as identifying the facts 
relevan t to recipients’ decisions while deter-
mining the relevant uncertainties, estimating 
their impact, formulating possible messages, 
and evaluating their success (Fischhoff and  
Davis, 2014). In addition, build ing community 
awareness of potential risks can also be d iffi-
cult if people hold  serious misconceptions 
about basic science concepts, if the scientific 
issues are socially contested , and if the hazard  
threat is politically charged (Stewart and  Lewis 
2017).  
The result is that the science/ public knowledge 
interface can quickly become more like the 
frontline of an information battlefield . In such 
combative circumstances, those conveying the 
risk of natural hazards to communities threat-
ened by them can find  themselves navigating a 
careful communication course between the 
technical nuances and uncertainties of extreme 
natural events on the one side and the norm a-
tive nuances and uncertainties of media prac-
tice and human behaviour on the other.   
The d ilemmas faced  by geoscientists in com-
municating risk during seismic crises have 
been most extensively documented  and acutely 
dissected  for the 2009 L’Aquila (Italy) earth-
quake and subsequent legal trial (Alexander, 
2010 and  2014; Marzocchi, 2012; Jordan, 2013; 
Di Capua and  Peppoloni, 2014; Dolce and  Di 
Bucci, 2014; Mucciarelli, 2014; Yeo, 2014; Cocco 
et al., 2015; DeVasto et al., 2016). Although ini-
tially framed as a trial of scientists who ‘failed’ 
to predict an earthquake, it is more widely in-
terpreted  as a failure in risk comm unication, as 
Oreskes (2016, p.254) notes: 
 
‘The case centered not on the matter of whether or 
not earthquakes can be predicted, but on political 
questions about the social obligations of scientists 
speaking in official advisory capacities, and epistem-
ic questions about the appropriate manner in which 
risk assessments should be performed. The questions 
at stake were what information scientists should 
have offered the public, and how that information 
should have been communicated. They were not so 
much matters of scientific facts, but matters of how 
those facts were rendered and communicated.’ 
 
Such ‘faulty’ communications arose because 
seismic crises are not simply geophysical ph e-
nomena but they are also socio-political inci-
dents. Their threat can motivate vested  busi-
ness interests to oppose the science 
(Geschwind , 1997 and  2011) and their incidence 
can be catalysts of cultural change or triggers 
for political upheaval (Clancey, 2006). As is ev-
ident in other areas of science, notably climate 
change d iscourse, conflicts of interest can result 
in ‘manufactured  uncertainty’ and the deliber-
ate obfuscation or misrepresentation of infor-
mation for which there is broad scientific con-
sensus (Michaels, 2005; Michaels and  Monfor-
ton, 2006; Oreskes and  Conway, 2007). In such 
contested  social spaces, the wisdom and re-
sponsibility of geoscientific experts in offering 
guidance or advocacy has been questioned : 
 
‘Whether scientists providing expert input into pol-
icy issues should be guided by extra-scientific values 
(and if so, whose values, and which values) in either 
the conduct or communication of their science, and 
even whether they should go beyond their scientific 
competence strictly speaking and provide advice 
about policy options, is open to debate’ (Yeo 2014). 
 
This societal entanglement has potentially 
transformative implications for the geoscien-
tists that study them, as acknowledged by 
Oreskes (2016, p .261): 
 
‘Earthquake safety has never been simply a matter of 
geophysics, but most earthquake scientists … have 
traditionally understood their job to be to study 
how, when, and why earthquakes happen, and only 
to a lesser extent (if at all) how to communicate that 
knowledge to engineers and officials responsible for 
mitigation, or to the general public … But in the 
contemporary world, the inter-relationship between 
knowledge and safety is not easily disentangled. 
ANNALS OF GEOPHYSICS, 60, FAST TRACK 7, 2017; DOI: 10.4401/ AG-7593 
 
 4 
Seismology is no longer simply a matter of geophysics, if 
it ever was. It involves consideration of ethics, values, 
and monetary and social costs. L’Aquila shows that sci-
entists can no longer ignore the social factors that affect 
and even control how damaging a particular earthquake 
may be. Earthquake prediction is a social science.’ 
 
In this paper, we carry forward Oreskes’s provo-
cation that earthquake science is a social science 
by considering the issue of how to communicate 
seismic risk in a public sphere in which the sci-
ence is socially contested and politically charged. 
Our consideration arises not from Italy but from 
Istanbul, another troublesome earthquake hot 
spot, and viewed not from the perspective of sen-
ior hazard specialists but instead from that of ear-
ly-career geoscientists. Motivated by their emer-
gent concerns, we examine key themes of risk 
communication that might be important if neigh-
bourhood-based participatory DRR is to be 
adopted by the earthquake science community. 
 
2. CASE STUDY: A SEISMIC CONFRONTATION 
IN ISTANBUL 
 
Istanbul, a mega-city of 14.5 million residents, 
faces a major earthquake threat (Hori et al., 
2017). Over the last century, a westward -
migrating sequence of large earthquakes has 
left one prominent segment of the North An a-
tolian Fault unruptured  (Armijo et al., 1999; 
Stein et al., 1997; Le Pichon et al., 2003). That 
segment lies immediately south of the city, be-
neath the waters of the Marmara Sea and seis-
mologists expect this seismic gap to be filled  by 
a M >7 earthquake in the coming decades (Par-
sons et al., 2000; Parsons, 2004; Bohnhoff et al., 
2013). The lethality of the threat is ev ident from 
a destructive earthquake that struck to the east 
of Istanbul in August 1999, killing 17,000 peo-
ple and making approximately half a million 
people homeless (Özerdem, 1999). Risk scenar-
ios for a fu ture Marmara Sea earthquake antic-
ipate significant fatalities and  widespread  
damage to residential housing and  urban infra-
structure. For example, a fu ture M 7.25 earth-
quake on this offshore segment is expected  to 
heavily damage or destroy 2-4% of the near 
1,000,000 build ings in Istanbul, with 9-15% of 
the build ings receiving medium damage and  
20-34% of the build ings lightly damaged  (Erdik 
et al., 2011; Erdik, 2013). Shaken by the 1999 
earthquakes, Istanbul’s civic authorities a t-
tempted  to address the acute seismic vulnera-
bility of the city through a series of legislative 
Figure 1: There is a strong cultural influence on people’s perspectives on the perceived earthquake threat. Based on in-
terviews with residents in earthquake-prone parts of USA, Japan and Turkey, most participants indicated a high aware-
ness of seismic adjustment but there was much variation in belief about the levels of human agency and control. Turkish 
participants tended strongly toward fatalism, regarded earthquakes as divine providence but displayed a heightened fo-
cus on vulnerabilities caused by institutional and collective failings, implying that the consequences of earthquakes were 
largely determined by the actions of people and society. Redrawn from Joffe et al. (2013, figure 4). 
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measures facilitating urban renewal. The con-
troversial implementation of the 2005 renewal 
law No. 5366 in the city’s historic d istricts au-
thorised  the central government housing d e-
velopment agency (TOKI) to undertake regen-
eration projects in seismically vulnerable 
gecekondu (squatter) neighbou rhoods, projects 
that met significant local resistance (Karaman, 
2008; Unsal, 2015). That resistance reflects legis-
lative changes that have been imposed by civic 
authorities. In 2012, the urban regeneration law  
No. 6306 extended  regeneration beyond the 
historic d istricts, targeting neighbourhoods 
that are generally not those most vulnerable to 
earthquake destruction but instead  represent 
areas where redevelopment is highly econom i-
cally profitable (Gibson and Gökşin, 2016). De-
spite a recognition that ‘seismic risk in the build-
ings in Istanbul is mostly dominated by building 
vulnerability, not hazard’ (Yakut et al., 2012, 
p.1533), there is widespread d istrust of Istan-
bul’s retrofitting and reconstruction measures 
even among residents of some of the city’s 
most at-risk quarters (Green, 2008; Islam, 2010; 
Karaman, 2013; Kuyucu, 2014). 
The roots of this d istrust go deep into the Turk-
ish ‘earthquake psyche’. A comparison of pop-
ulations living in earthquake-prone areas in Ja-
pan, USA and  Turkey revealed  that especially 
strong and  varied  emotions permeate Turkish 
earthquake perceptions and  attitudes (Joffe et 
al., 2013) (Fig. 1). Direct experiences with the 
1999 earthquakes have provoked heightened 
feelings of worry, fear and anxiety, but in add i-
tion there were strong expressions of corru p-
tion and incompetence of politicians, civil serv-
ants, planning regulators and the construction 
industry (Fig. 2). For many, it was this endemic 
corruption, greed  and selfishness that was seen 
to produce urban vulnerability, and in turn 
created  a heightened sense of d issonance (fatal-
ism) and weakened sense of control and self-
efficacy. Thus, despite a substantial awareness 
of the earthquake risk, Joffe et al. (2013) report 
that Turkish respondents were far less likely 
than their US or Japanese equivalents to adopt 
seismic adjustment measures, a tendency also 
apparent in other studies (Rustemli and  
Karanci, 1999; Özerdem, 1999; Eraybar et al., 
Figure 2: The emotional and moral responses of people to earthquakes vary in strength and character between three earth-
quake-prone countries – USA, Japan and Turkey. Fear and anxiety-related emotions dominate in all three countries, but 
Turkish participants show a greater prevalence of grief- and trauma- related emotions and display considerably more emo-
tions relating to moral issues such as corruption (e.g., anger, distrust, blame). From Joffe et al. (2013, figure 3). 
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2010; Tekeli‐Yeşil et al., 2010a, 2010b, and 2011; 
Oral et al., 2015; Taylan, 2015). Indeed, Joffe et 
al. (2013) report that the Turkish respondents 
who felt themselves most vulnerable to earth-
quakes d isplayed the lowest adoption of anti-
seismic adjustment measures. In such a socially 
polarised  and politically sensitive context, d e-
veloping neighbourhood -based participatory 
strategies for seismic risk communication 
would  appear d ifficult.  
To explore this d ifficu lty, a communication 
training workshop for early-career geoscien-
tists held  in Istanbul d irectly confronted  twelve 
PhD and postdoctoral researchers with the 
overtly politicised  nature of the Istanbul earth-
quake threat (Ickert and  Stewart, 2016). As part 
of the workshop the young geoscientists visited  
at-risk neighbourhoods within the city to hear 
from residents and community leaders about 
how the city’s seismic risk was manifest ‘on the 
ground’, witnessing firsthand the effects of the 
unpopular urban renewal transformation pro-
gramme. Following this field  provocation , Ick-
ert and  Stew art (2016) report how the work-
shop participants were invited  to d iscuss their 
perceived role as communicators. Across the 
group of young researchers there was broad  
agreement on the relevance and importance of 
their expert knowledge reaching at-risk com-
munities, but considerable d iscussion about the 
appropriate way and level of engaging with the 
public. 
 
Researcher 1: If you know that something will hap-
pen [...] that many people could die [...] you will 
have to communicate that. You have to com-
municate that in order to prepare people. 
 
Although this view was widely shared , much 
debate centred  on the participants’ individual 
understandings of the role and responsibility of 
geocommunicators, and what implications this 
had  for their professional life. For some, the 
d isincentives to communicating more wid ely 
were practical as well as moral: 
 
Researcher 8: (...) It is our responsibility. But the 
problem is: We are not paid for that. We have to 
maintain a career as well. And this is only one 
of the little aspects that are very relevant. We 
have to do it for the sake of it. We do a lot of 
things for science which are for free. And we al-
so have a hard time to maintain a pace...and to 
do publications, to find the next position and so 
on. So it is a very difficult balance. 
Researcher 7: There is no real reward. 
Researcher 8: Well, it depends on how you interpret 
reward. 
 
Some participants found  it crucial not to blur 
the boundary between scientists and  non -
scientists and to retain their role as “objective 
experts”, feeling uneasy with the prospect of 
operating beyond the geoscience realm. 
 
Researcher 11: I think you should do your best to 
improve your analyses and get proper results 
and publish and explain these results to proper 
people. For example, the government or the ad-
ministration. And these people should know 
what to do with this. You can give them sug-
gestions what you think is the best idea to use 
the results and how to protect the people, but the 
decision belongs to them. 
Researcher 4: In my humble opinion, science has 
something to do with knowledge. Policies, haz-
ard mitigation, those are things related to 
judgement, to decision-making. Those are two 
completely different things. 
 
For some participants, a d irect engagement 
with residents, particularly in politicized  con-
texts, was considered  as negatively affecting 
their role as scientists, potentially risking a loss 
of reputation, trust and scientific credibility 
due to actual or perceived advocacy positions. 
Others, whilst acknowledging these worries, 
stressed  instead  the ‘moral and professional 
duty’ to d irectly provide their expertise to 
communities, especially in situations where in-
habitants face an acute risk and openly request 
closer collaborations with scientists. For them, 
there was a ‘risk of losing public trust’ when 
not reacting to shortcomings of communica-
tion, but at the same time an anxiety about 
drifting into the role of ‘advocate’ or even ‘ac-
tivist’, as this exchange demonstrates: 
 
Researcher 8: A  hypothetical case, let’s imagine the 
scientific community has a very clear view that 
the Marmara earthquake is going to happen in 
five years time, and it is going to be magnitude 
8. Then what is your responsibility, when people 
are not reached by standard geoscience commu-
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nication? This is how I face this problem. Then 
you really have to push the boundaries and tell 
the people that they should move away from the 
boundary […] but I am already in the activist 
part. 
Researcher 2: You’re looking at the human aspect, 
not at the scientific aspect. As a human being, 
when you see that something bad will happen 
very soon, then of course you will push people 
and try to fix the problem [...]. As a scientist you 
just have to do the research, get the information 
and share it. 
Researcher 8: But I absolutely don’t feel like this – 
this is my scientific part and this is my human 
part [...] I don’t understand why geoscience 
should be communicated in a very specific, nar-
row way, for example centred on geohazards. 
Then people might know something about the 
physics, but they don’t really do anything in 
their daily lives. And this is the challenge. 
Researcher 7: You could make sure that you inform 
the public better, so that they can find a way 
around this corrupt system so that people are in-
formed to really make decisions. 
Researcher 10: But this is really complicated. 
 
This d isagreement about roles and responsibili-
ties of geoscientists in the risk communication 
process suggest that the multitude of factors 
that influence how risk communication is per-
ceived, interpreted  and translated  by inhabit-
ants of at-risk communities is equally recog-
nised  by scientists. Despite this, there was con-
sensus among the group on the necessity to 
more effectively connect with at-risk communi-
ties in order to reduce their seismic vulnerabil-
ity. In addressing this, however, there was u n-
certainty about whether the young geoscien-
tists had  the appropriate skillset to successfu lly 
engage with lay audiences. Some felt confident 
in this aspect, giving personal examples of sci-
ence–public interactions, such as encounters 
with local residents in the course of their field  
work, incidents in which they “had to get in-
formation from local people”, and were asked  
to “explain” what “they are doing”. In that con-
text, some support for the value of a more par-
ticipatory approach emerged : 
Researcher 6: Why do you think that only the geo-
scientists give the information? Maybe there are 
things that you don’t know, and that only an ordi-
nary person knows. For example when you go to the 
field, [...] to a little village, if you are working on a 
recent event of that region, you go to the manager of 
the village, and you talk to him, for example “Have 
you ever had any floods in this area?” It is a com-
munication situation and you learn from a person 
that is not a geoscientist. 
 
More generally, however, the researchers felt 
insufficiently skilled  in communication to reach 
be-yond the academic and professional geosci-
ence community. Interaction with lay audien c-
es was judged  a ‘rather unknown territory’. 
Given this perceived skills deficit, debate 
emerged about whether it was more effective 
to ‘pinpoint the communication talents’ within 
the geoscience com munity or instead  to engage 
in interd isciplinary research collaborations. Li-
aising with social scientists were proposed, as 
was working with intermediaries or translators 
- media representatives, NGOs or even artists - 
to more effectively share knowledge with peo-
ple on the ground. This brief exchange captures 
the essence of that d isagreement: 
 
Researcher 10: Our responsibility is to produce sci-
ence and use other scientists who can talk to 
people, like anthropologists, sociologists or peo-
ple who have studied philosophy, psychology, 
this kind of stuff... My point is that we need a 
bridge to communicate with the people. We can-
not communicate directly. We need a translator.  
Researcher 3: Or translate it ourselves.  
Researcher 2: It won´t be that easy for us. 
 
The implications arising from these workshop 
d iscussions are examined in detail by Ickert 
and  Stewart (2016), but here we highlight the 
basic d ilemma: communicating d irectly with 
at-risk communities is recognised  as being im-
portant but there was a general anxiety about 
how easily or effectively geoscientists can 
adopt such a participatory approach. In this 
regard , the early-career geoscientists raise criti-
cal questions about how best to integrate other 
d isciplinary perspectives, particularly those 
from the social sciences, into their geo-risk ex-
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pertise. Stimulated  by these methodological 
d ialogues, the following sections summarise 
some key findings that have emerged from 
broader social science d iscourses on risk com-
munication. 
 
3. FAULTY COMMUNICATIONS - 
TOWARDS A SOCIAL SCIENCE OF 
CONVEYING SEISMIC RISK 
 
3.1 The Risk Perception Paradox 
 
‘The majority of people at risk from earthquakes do 
little or nothing to reduce their vulnerability’ (Sol-
berg et al., 2010, p.1663). 
 
The conventional way of communicating risk is 
through education campaigns that raise public 
awareness of hazard  threats. This approach 
rests on the assumption that individ uals or 
communities with high hazard  awareness are 
more likely to respond to warnings and under-
take preparedness measures than individuals 
or communities with a lower/ deficient hazard  
awareness. Increase an individual’s perception 
of a threat, the assumption goes, and you im-
prove their preparedness. Demeritt and Norb-
ert (2014) describe this approach to risk com-
munication either under the term “risk mes-
sage model”, referring to the belief that sound 
risk communication is about faithfu lly trans-
mitting risk information without d istortion, or 
under the term of a “risk instrument model”, a 
communication approach with the goal to elicit 
certain cognitive or behavioural responses in 
the target audiences that are addressed  (De-
meritt and Norbert, 2014). However, several 
decades of social science research indicates that 
there can be little or no correlation between the 
provision of scientific information about geo-
physical hazards and risks and the adoption of 
preparedness measures by individuals or 
communities (Palm and Hodgson, 1992; Palm, 
1998; Spittal et al., 2008; Solberg et al., 2010; 
Wood et al., 2011). While the hazard  scientist is 
steeped in probabilistic or deterministic thin k-
ing about the chances or impacts of an extreme 
event, the statistical likelihood of a d isaster is 
barely taken into account when ordinary peo-
ple make judgments about perceived risk lev-
els, and the perceived magnitude of a d isaster 
seems equally to be of little importance. In-
stead , there is a growing appreciation of the 
role of socio-cultural, cognitive and emotional 
variables in risk perception and behaviour. 
Solberg et al. (2010) provide a comprehensive 
review of how people think, feel and act about 
seismic risk ad justment, arguing that individ u-
al or collective aware-ness is shaped by a myri-
ad  of social factors, psychological biases and 
cultural norms, including experience, opti-
mism, demographic characteristics (gender, 
age, status), perceptions of fate and fatalism, 
individual and community feelings of control, 
self-efficacy and empowerment, as well as the 
degree of trust in experts and authorities. All of 
these risk mediators are sensitive to cultural 
and political contexts, and all need to be con-
sidered  if risk communication is to be tru ly ef-
fective. 
The ‘risk perception paradox’ (Wachinger et al., 
2013) contends that if risk perception is only 
loosely related  to risk ad justment, then simply 
d isseminating information on seismic hazard  
and societal vulnerability to exposed popula-
tions may not motivate meaningful risk redu c-
tion behaviour. This reappraisal rests on a 
broader rejection by communication practition-
ers of the over-reliance on factual information 
in conveying scientific issues to the public 
(Burns et al., 2003; Nisbet, 2009). After all, the 
‘facts’ around  complex scientific issues a re of-
ten contested  even by the experts, and  the same 
technical problem can be presented  in very d if-
ferent ways to elicit markedly contrasting re-
sponses. In the febrile atmosphere of natural 
emergencies and crisis situations it can be ex-
pected  that ‘facts will be repeatedly misapplied and 
twisted in direct proportion to their relevance to the 
political debate and decision-making’ (Nisbet and  
Mooney, 2009, p.56), with the result that even 
‘… compelling scientific information often runs 
aground almost as soon as it is launched into the 
choppy waters of public discourse’ (Weber and  
Word , 2001, p.488). 
The social psychology of how people receive 
and process information about risk decisions is 
complex and contested , and the implications 
this has for science communication in general 
are d iscussed  elsewhere (e.g. Jamieson et al., 
2017; National Academies of Sciences, Engi-
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neering, and Medicine, 2017). However, the 
headline messages that have emerged from 
several decades of human and behavioural re-
search are neatly sum marised  by Cormick 
(2014) (Fig. 3): 
 
1. ‘when information is complex, people make deci-
sions based on their values and beliefs’;  
2. ‘people seek affirmation of their attitudes or be-
liefs, no matter how strange those views are’. 
This tendency means that ind ividuals will 
reject information or evidence that are 
counter to those attitudes and beliefs (Ka-
han et al., 2010); the fact that new infor-
mation consistent with one’s beliefs is more 
easily seen as reliable and informative than 
information that d iscredits one’s initial be-
liefs explains why beliefs change very slow-
ly and  are quite enduring in the face of con-
trary evidence (Nisbett and  Ross, 1980).   
3. ‘people most trust those whose values mirror their 
own’. They tend to look to others around  
them for social clues on how to act, which 
can either accentuate or decrease social ac-
ceptance of the risk of a given issue (Kahan 
et al., 2010). As a consequence, individuals 
generally make more risky or extreme deci-
sions as part of a group than as an ind ivid-
ual;  
4. ‘attitudes that were not formed by logic or facts, are 
not influenced by logical or factual arguments’; 
5. ‘public concerns about contentious science are al-
most never about the science - and scientific infor-
mation therefore does little to influence these con-
cerns.’ 
 
The notion that logical and  factual arguments 
may be subordinate to value judgements and  
instinctive thinking in determining how people 
make sense of technically complex issues has 
important implications for how the geoscience 
community conveys its science to the pu blic. 
After all, conventionally, geoscientists tend to 
build  communication strategies around con-
veying clear, simple explanations of the tech-
nical detail. They do so because that is what 
geoscientists have been trained to do, because 
it is that technical know -how that defines their 
own understanding of the problem, and be-
cause other crucial stakeholders - regulators, 
engineers, planners and lawyers - demand  it. 
Figure 3: Social science research highlights a few headline messages of how people make decisions about complex and con-
tested environmental concerns (after Cormick, 2014). 
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Figure 4: In the context of community conflicts, Sandman (1993) argues that ‘risk’ is a product of ‘hazard x outrage’. Re-
ducing risk can be achieved by lowering outrage through adjusting the levels of the primary components of community 
anxiety. 
But marshalling the scientific facts, illustrating 
them with simple graphics, and explaining 
them unclu ttered  by jargon, seems unlikely to 
address public concerns: 
 
‘It is not enough to assure that scientifically sound 
information – including evidence of what sci-entists 
themselves believe – is widely disseminated: cultural 
cognition strongly motivates individuals – of all 
worldviews – to recognize such information as 
sound in a selective pattern that reinforces their cul-
tural predispositions. To overcome this effect, com-
municators must attend to the cultural meaning as 
well as the scientific content of information’ (Kahan 
et al., 2010, p.23). 
 
3.2 Risk = Hazard x Outrage 
 
Understanding the social and cultural constru c-
tion of risk is recognised  to be at the heart of 
community-centred  participatory approaches 
to d isaster risk redu ction. It is a notion rooted  
strongly in the psychometric model of risk per-
ception (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987 and  
1989; Slovic et al., 1991; Fischhoff, 1995), which 
deconvolves the composite public view of 
‘risky’ scientific issues. The ‘psychom etric’ risk 
paradigm has been widely applied  by San d-
man (1987, 1989, and  1993), who contends that 
most local environmental controversies com-
prise two competing frames. The first is a tech-
nical framing of the problem, involving argu-
ments about the scientific analysis of the haz-
ards that are perceived to threaten a commun i-
ty. The second relates to the social context 
within which those hazards exist and the pro-
cesses by which a community’s anxieties fuels 
collective anger. According to Sandman (1993), 
that community anger is rooted  in a range of 
concerns – including trust, control, voluntari-
ness, dread , and familiarity – which he collec-
tively terms ‘outrage factors’ (Fig. 4).  
Sandman (1993) contends that when the experts 
and the public disagree about the technical as-
pects (such as the magnitude of a particular threat 
or its probability of occurrence), the experts are 
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more likely to be correct. And yet, although scien-
tists readily point out how the public often mis-
perceives the hazard, they rarely acknowledge 
that they themselves pay little attention to that 
component of the perceived risk that is socially 
constructed. 
 
‘The experts, when they talk about risk, focus on haz-
ard and ignore outrage. They therefore tend to overes-
timate the risk when the hazard is high and the outrage 
is low, and underestimate the risk when the hazard is 
low and the outrage is high - because all they are doing 
is looking at the hazard. The public, in precise parallel, 
focuses on outrage and ignores hazard. The public, 
therefore, overestimates the risk when the outrage is 
high and the hazard is low, and underestimates the risk 
when the outrage is low and the hazard is high’ 
(Sandman, 1993, p.8). 
 
The public’s concerns - the social risk - is fre-
quently dismissed by scientific experts as being 
irrational, unfounded or manipulated, even 
though it is evident from community protests 
that the resulting anxiety, fear and anger is argu-
ably more tangible and measureable than the un-
derlying hazard. In the context of community 
conflicts, Sandman suggests that the technical 
view of risk as a product of ‘hazard x vulnerabil-
ity’ is more usefully reformulated as being a 
product of ‘hazard x outrage’. This, in turn, sets 
the template for risk communication strategies. 
 
‘Two things are true in the typical risk controversy: 
People overestimate the hazard and people are out-
raged. To decide how to respond, we must know which 
is mostly cause and which is mostly effect. If people are 
outraged because they overestimate the hazard, the so-
lution is to explain the hazard better. But if they over-
estimate the hazard because they are outraged, the so-
lution is to figure out why they are outraged - and 
change it.’ 
 
3.3 Risk Dialogues and Honest Brokers 
 
‘… public participation measures are probably the 
most effective means to create awareness of potential 
disasters, to enhance trust in public authorities, and 
to encourage citizens to take more personal respon-
sibility for protection and disaster preparedness. It 
will be a major challenge for risk management and 
also an important research topic for future research 
to understand people’s responses to natural hazards 
as well as a combination of natural and technologi-
cal hazards and to design the most appropriate 
measures for effective risk communication, stake-
holder involvement, and emergency preparedness’ 
(Wachinger et al., 2013). 
 
An alternative approach to conventional risk 
message model of communication is the “risk 
d ialogue model”, which is based  on the belief 
that the d iverse expertise of mix of civil society 
actors must be systematically anchored if a rel-
evant solu tion to reduce vulnerability is to be 
found (Demeritt and Norbert, 2014). Engaging 
with the wider civil society in a more particip a-
tory way about earthquake threats means fram-
ing seismic risk communication not sim ply as 
the conventional one-way transfer of infor-
mation from the technical expert to the ‘end  
user’, but also as a two-way exchange with 
stakeholder groups about what concerns them. 
In short, paraphrasing Latour (1994), it requires 
a mindset shift from conveying ‘matters of fact’ 
to developing d ialogues around ‘matters of 
concern’, recognizing that shared  rather than 
unidirectional flows of information are more 
likely to promote knowledge and attitude 
change (Stewart and  Lewis, 2017). Scientific 
and technical information are necessary for this 
process, but are not the sole basis on which d e-
cisions or actions are made. When accessible 
scientific information about a contested  scien-
tific issue is presented  in well-organized  social 
spaces in which ordinary people can form and  
express their opinions, the public can actively 
participate in scientific decision making: 
 
‘It appears that people understand some things quite 
well, although their path to knowledge may be quite 
different from that of the technical experts…given 
an atmosphere of trust in which both experts and 
lay persons recognize that each group may have 
something to contribute to the discussion, exchange 
of information and deepening of perspectives may 
well be possible’ (Slovic, 1985, p.170). 
 
Whether d irected  at the public or at policy 
makers, more effective communication emerg-
es from participatory engagement and d ialogue 
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with individuals and communities (Wachinger 
et al., 2012).  
Participation processes allow the public to gain 
knowledge and personal agency with respect 
to risks and protective measures, and  author i-
ties to gain knowledge from the “lay ex-
perts”/ the public and to collect ideas for 
measures that are effective for the given pop u-
lation. Individuals and  communities can be risk 
amplifiers or inhibitors. Thus, as well as gau g-
ing the intrinsic vulnerability of those living in 
hazard -prone settings, collective conversations 
provide the expert with a valuable information 
archive. These d ialogues can reveal a social 
memory of past events and  highlight how pre-
ventative measures may be built into tradition-
al practices and vernacular architecture. Final-
ly, a shared  responsibility for solu tions in such 
a d ialogue situation can also promote the social 
implementation of them . 
Yet, despite its apparent benefits, a more par-
ticipatory approach raises ethical d ilemmas for 
a geoscientist, not least of which is the potential 
drift away from being a neutral mediator of in-
dependent knowledge to a participant that is 
engaged with, or perhaps even embedded in, 
community concerns. The scientist as an ‘advo-
cate’ or even ‘activist’ for a specific course of 
action is one that many - experts and non-
experts alike - are uncomfortable with. In d is-
tinguishing d ifferent ‘kinds’ of scientist, Pielke 
(2007) highlights the important role of the 
‘honest broker’ - the specialist who can inte-
grate stakeholder concerns with available sci-
entific knowledge to open up and inform a 
range of options. Drawing on the faulty com-
munications and their epistemological roots 
during the Tuhoku and Fu kishima catastrophe, 
Lacassin and Lavelle (2016) highlight the re-
sponsibility of communicating uncertainties 
through such ‘honest brokers’. According to 
the authors, they need not only to focus on the 
decision-relevant elements of that communi-
cated  uncertainties, but also uncover the uncer-
tainties that scientists fail or avoid  to mention 
because of dominant communication para-
digms, arguing that: 
 
‘… to promote real democratic and open debate and 
choices, [scientists] have the responsibility to com-
municate and properly explain all uncertainties and 
unknowns to the technical and political sphere as 
well as to the rest of the society’ (Lacassin and  
Lavelle, 2016, p.57). 
 
As honest brokers, effective geoscience com-
munication becomes not simply a case of secu r-
ing public acceptance, but, rather, of securing 
public trust. It is arguably more important to 
build  trust than to build  technical understan d-
ing because trust is used  by people as a surro-
gate tool - a cognitive shortcut - for reducing 
the complexity of scientific information. And it 
is that trust that will be crucial later if warnings 
and  other types of vital information are to be 
taken seriously during an emergency 
(Wachinger et al., 2013). Those scientific bro-
kers who genuinely engage with affected  
communities are likely to have a particularly 
privileged place in the deliberative process be-
cause, in addition to their grasp of technical 
complexity, they will be afforded a high degree 
of public trust. Yet that elevated  degree of in-
fluence, and the anticipated  co-production of 
knowledge that accompanies a community-
centred  approach, may make many geoscien-
tists anxious that their much valued indepen d-
ence will be compromised . 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The ethical responsibility of scientists is the 
communication of balanced  factual infor-
mation, yet the relative prominence given to 
those facts is crucial. To convey a scientific 
message in a way that gains wide acceptance 
requires a simplified  message stripped of the 
usual technical caveats. The ethical burden that 
this places on the science communicator as an 
honest broker of knowledge is obvious. The 
climate science communicator Stephen Schnei-
der dubbed it the ‘double ethical bind’, noting 
that ‘Each of us has to decide what the right balance 
is between being effective and being honest. I hope 
that means being both’ (Schneider, 2002, p.498). 
The challenge for those working in d isaster risk 
communication is how to convey what they 
know honestly and effectively to those people 
who can benefit from that knowledge. In terms 
of the former, it requires hazard  scientists to 
better understand  the social psychology of how 
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people receive and process information, and in 
doing so learn how best to frame the intrica-
cies, uncertainties and limitations of their intr i-
cate technical science in ways that are more 
easily grasped by lay audiences. In universities 
and research institu tes it will be crucial to train 
the next generation of geoscientists in the sci-
ence and art of communication, being more 
journalistic and media-savvy in the way we 
communicate, and more imaginative in explor-
ing new communication channels, such as web-
based platforms, social media. The new  reality 
is that in times of the crisis factual scientific in-
formations can be quickly (minutes to hours) 
transmitted  through social media (e.g. Twitter, 
Facebook), thereby helping people to appreci-
ate the geophysical understanding of an ongo-
ing natural event. In the same way, however, 
misinformation or misconceived facts can 
equally prominently be instantly relayed, 
meaning that public trust in honest scientific 
brokers must be maintained. For this reason, 
alongside the obvious appeal of new, remote 
mobile technologies and d igital communica-
tions, face-to-face encounters will be critical for 
effective community-centred  d isaster d ia-
logues. In those encounters, geoscientists 
should  expect to meet the public in their own 
community spaces - in schools, places of wor-
ship, civic halls and social clubs. In addition, 
deliberative formats such a ‘Reallabore’ (Mar-
quardt and  West, 2016), science shops (Schlierfs 
and  Meyer, 2013) or various formats of infor-
mal, d ialogue-oriented  citizen participation 
(Kamlage et al., 2018) are important forums 
where more d irect two-way communication 
approaches between d ifferent stakeholders can 
take place. 
But as well as being more effective, geoscien-
tists need  to better appreciate that their seismic 
risk communications are undertaken in con-
tested  socio-political contexts and bring ethical 
d ilemmas. The expert technical knowledge of 
the earthquake geoscientist may be afforded a 
heightened degree of trust by those individ uals 
and communities most at risk, but that brings 
responsibility. Ironically, the more effectively a 
potential seismic threat is communicated  by the 
geoscientist, the more that scientific message 
will be normalized  into the complex, chaotic 
and contested  d iscourses of daily life. Partici-
patory-based engagement strategies anticipate 
technical experts taking account of these local 
socio-cultural, emotional and even political 
d imensions of risk in working d irectly with 
vulnerable communities. In such circumstan c-
es, scientific risk messages can become h ijacked  
by or assimilated  into social, economic and  p o-
litical controversies. The challenge for those 
working at the contested  frontline of seismic 
risk communications will be balancing the eth i-
cal binds that continue to constrain us in our 
role as honest brokers 
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